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AbstrAct
This article explores some of the key differences in conditions, procedures, and interests among major trading 
blocs and selected countries within them. Its primary focus is on the challenges faced by an intellectual 
property (ip) regime, especially related to ip protection. In the Asian context, consideration is given to the status 
and challenge of ip protection in Indonesia, and, for contrast, Japan, with its singular history of ip acquisition. 
Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region of China, is considered separately as is part of the People’s Repu b lic 
of China. Then the EU and the United States are addressed. In addition, the divergence of interests between net 
technology-consuming economies (ntces) and net technology-producing economies (ntpes) are considered.
Keywords: intellectual property, intellectual property protection, counterfeiting, piracy, divergent ip 
interests, ip environment
resumen
Este artículo explora algunas de las diferencias fundamentales en las condiciones, procedimientos e intereses 
entre los bloques comerciales más importantes y algunos países que forman parte de éstos. Se centra 
principalmente en los desafíos que enfrenta el régimen de la propiedad intelectual (pi), particularmente en 
lo que concierne a su pro tec ción. En el contexto asiático se considera la situación y el desafío que representa 
la protección de la pi en Indonesia, en comparación con Japón, con su historia única res pecto a la adquisición 
de pi, o bien de Hong Kong, una región administrativa especial de China, la cual se ve de manera indepen-
diente, aunque sea parte de la República Popular de China. Además, se aborda la situa ción de la Unión 
Europea y de Estados Unidos, así como la diferencia de intereses entre las economías consumi do ras de 
tecnología (ntces, por sus siglas en inglés) y las productoras de tec nología (ntpes, por sus siglas en inglés).
Palabras clave: propiedad intelectual, protección a la propiedad intelectual, falsificación, piratería, intereses 
divergentes en propiedad intelectual, propiedad intelectual y medio ambiente
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IntroductIon
This article sets out to compare and contrast the intellectual property rights (iprs) environ-
ment in Asia, the European Union, and North America. This is a very large and complex 
issue. ip has intrinsic and potentially verifiable value. It provides a firm with a compe-
titive edge and enables it to differentiate itself from its competitors. Yet, loss of ip is one 
of the major risks companies can expect to encounter while doing business in a global 
economy, especially in locales where there is less developed respect for ipr law. And, as 
Baer (1995) puts it, ideas do not exist in a vacuum; ultimately, they are made into pro d-
ucts and services when material and intellectual property become one. For this reason, 
the U.S. Council for International Business urges developing countries in particular to in-
crease ipr enforcement, which is critical to the attraction of foreign investment. A country 
with poor ipr protection deters foreign technology investments (Kamalick, 2006). 
iprs apply to many different situations and protective rights may be applied to 
different factors such as patented technology or image, etc. For example, in the mu-
sic business, rights for synchronization of voice with image exist, and in that context 
these are valuable assets. I shall, however, attempt to remain more abstract without 
being distracted by such detail. After a brief introduction to the importance of iprs, I 
will proceed to scrutinize the ip environments of Asia, the EU, and North America, 
each in turn. The section on Asia is much longer than those on the EU and North 
America. This is for two reasons, beyond being commensurate with its geographical 
scale and huge population. First, Japan, the world’s third biggest economy, was built 
on the acquisition of ip, on favorable terms, from the United States. Second, China is 
at the core of the challenge to the integrity of the ip system in the world today. Much 
of what is happening in North America and the EU is reactive to China. 
bAckground
Taking a geopolitical perspective, McNabb (2006) maintains that iprs should be at 
the core of international stability calculations. After the demise of bipolarity with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, he maintains that at least two significant impediments 
remain to creating a more secure, cooperative, and prosperous global system. One in-
volves miscalculations on the part of the West. The other is a fundamental misunder-
standing in Moscow and Beijing regarding the nature of success inherent in liberal 
democracies and market economies. 
McNabb (2006) explains that a policy that requires irrationality on the part of de-
cision makers in the developing world is prone to suboptimal outcomes and hints 
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that chaos and conflict may result. Moreover, leaders in the former Soviet Union and 
Beijing, he suggests, misunderstand the most important dimensions of long-term 
Western success, one of which is secure intellectual property rights. iprs create the 
incentives for innovation, creativity, and technical change. Institutionalizing the rule 
of law and securing private property rights protect entrepreneurs as they take risks 
in order to make economic gains. If secure private property rights had not been 
institutio nalized in Europe and the United States for the past 300 years, incentives 
for innovation and creativity would have been reduced, as would overall economic 
productivity.
“I feel as though my name and my works have been hijacked, against my wish-
es, for the personal gain and profit of others and diverted from the charities I intended 
to benefit,” said J. K. Rowling, author of the Harry Potter series, in a statement to a 
court where she was the primary plaintiff in an action against RDR Books, a small book 
publisher based in Michigan. RDR Books had planned to publish a book by Steven 
Vander Ark, who maintains a fans’ website called the Harry Potter Lexicon. The Lexicon 
is a Harry Potter encyclopedia for obsessive fans (Nocera, 2005). She is essentially 
claiming that the decision to allow a Harry Potter encyclopedia to exist is hers alone, 
since the characters in her books are her intellectual property. And in her view, no one 
else can use them without her permission. As Nocera (2005) explains, iprs are being 
used in the opposite way to which they were intended. Instead of being a spur to crea ti v-
ity, they have become a brake. Copyright holders, for example, attempt to impose rules 
through threats and litigation that were never intended to be part of copyright law. Mu-
sic artists sue to prevent others from taking samples of copyrighted songs to create their 
own music. And authors’ estates try to deprive scholars of their ability to reprint parts 
of books or articles because they disapprove of the scholar’s perspective.
Nevertheless, ensuring that iprs are protected remains a challenge. Foreign com-
panies, Fishman (2005) outlines, lose control of their goods in two related ways: through 
counterfeiters, who copy products and then sell them under different or altered brand 
names; and through pirates, who make look-alikes and try to pass them off as the real 
thing. Of the different types of transgression, piracy is most common. Patent in -
fringement represents another common type of transgression. Unfortunately, patent 
infringement often pays off for the infringer —a longstanding, worldwide phenom-
enon. Typically those who infringe, if caught, end up paying what they would have 
paid if they had originally negotiated a license. So there is little incentive in the system 
to encourage compliance (Arai, 2000).
Following this brief background we move to explore the environments in differ-
ent territories beginning with Asia. The main focus in the Asia section is on Japan 
and China. This is because the acquisition of ip by Japan from the U.S. was a significant 
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driver for its economic resurgence. And as we will also see, the misappropriation of 
ip by China will remain a sensitive topic for the foreseeable future. 
AsIA
Asia is a huge territory, covering 30 percent of the world’s land area, and, with over 
4 billion people, comprising more than 60 percent of the world’s population. It is varied 
and culturally diverse so for this article, I will touch on only some of the key markets 
as they relate to ip. 
Commonly, Asia is seen as having less respect for ip than is the case in Europe 
and the U.S. However, MacDonald and Turpin (2007) argue that, though in theory, 
small and medium firms have much to gain from the intellectual property rights sys-
tem, in practice, small and medium-sized enterprises (sMes) have trouble using the ipr 
system. Yet sMes in Asia and the rest of the developing world are encouraged by the 
developed to look to iprs to become more innovative and hence competitive. For them, 
copying may be a more appropriate and successful form of technology transfer than 
licensing iprs from developed countries. Ultimately, though, the East-West ip divide 
will diminish to the benefit of both (Sanders, 2006). Citing the US$100 million-plus 
cross-licensing agreement between Creative Technology of Singapore and Apple 
Inc. to settle a long-running ip dispute, Sanders (2006) maintains this not only to be 
a great business opportunity for the two companies, but also an example of rising 
global demand for Asian ip.
Moreover, as Asian enterprises increasingly invest in ip protection and compli-
ance and intellectual property management, the mutual respect and awareness that 
East and West need to continue to develop becomes entrenched in respective busi-
ness practices. This, in turn, supports an increasingly global enterprise willingness 
to share and protect ip assets. However, that is the theory, and the theory does not 
always find fertile pastures in which to flourish. Indonesia is perhaps at the low end 
of the ipr fertility spectrum.
Indonesia
While it is popular to cite China and Thailand as major centers of counterfeiting and 
for their lack of respect for ip generally, trademark owners have achieved some suc-
cess in protecting even unconventional trademarks in Thailand. But even lost fights 
have encouraged Thailand’s trademark regime to evolve and modernize (Indananda 
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and Kanchanapairoj, 2009). With its population of almost 240 million, Indonesia is, 
despite top-line legislation, a hotbed of ip infringement. Not surprisingly, in the light 
of this high infringement level, it does not have much of the necessary infringement 
protection machinery in place. 
Nevertheless, since 1998, Indonesia has significantly reformed its intellectual 
property laws to meet international expectations. For example, in 2000, Plant Vari-
eties, Trade Secrets, Industrial Designs, and Circuit Layout Laws were passed. The 
following year, the People’s Representative Council replaced Indonesia’s Patents and 
Trademark Laws. A new Copyright Law was passed in 2002, coming into force one 
year later according to Butt and Lindsey (2005). These new laws bring Indonesia’s 
intellectual property regime in line with many of the minimum standards of substan-
tive intellectual property law required under Part II of the World Trade Organization’s 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (trips). 
The new legislation also introduces the civil enforcement mechanisms and cri m-
inal penalties required by Part III of the trips Agreement. Butt and Lindsey (2005) 
claim that these enforcement provisions have only rarely been used, however, with 
the result that Indonesia’s new intellectual property legislation has had little practi-
cal effect. Actually, infringements appear to have increased since the reforms. Optical 
media are perhaps the most conspicuous of Indonesia’s many pirate industries. The 
International Intellectual Property Alliance (iipa) estimates that 92 percent of movies, 
80 percent of music recordings, and 87 percent of business software sold in Indonesia 
is pirated, causing a combined loss of US$203.6 million to United States right-hold-
ers in 2004. However, this loss figure is somewhat tendentious, as the argument can 
be made that unrealized revenues do not equate to losses.
The iipa also reports very high levels of entertainment software infringement 
and claims that piracy is now crippling Indonesia’s domestic music industry. Indeed, 
Indonesia’s Sound Recording Industry Association (Asiri) estimates that ten pirated 
versions were sold for each original recording sold in 2002, equating to 17 trillion 
rupiah (US$1.8 billion) in losses (unrealized revenues) for the domestic recording 
industry. Some popular music groups have seemingly refused to write new songs, 
claiming that they lose too much income to counterfeiters. Trademark piracy is also 
rampant, with fake goods widely available at almost every public market and mall in 
the country, and, Butt and Lindsey (2005) observe, even in kiosks at the main office of the 
Directorate General of Intellectual Property. 
Apparently most Indonesian judges are not interested in making the rules on 
injunctions function in intellectual property cases. They believe them to be impracti-
cal in the Indonesian context. Often judges reckon that intellectual property law is 
not in Indonesia’s best interests at its current level of development. Judges are also 
36
DaviD McHarDy reiD
norteaMérica
poorly remunerated (Bedner, 2001) and rely on bribes to support their incomes. A num-
ber of powerful arguments support this view that ipr law is not in Indonesia’s interest, 
and these views permeate Indonesian legal circles. Indonesia has relatively few do-
mestic intellectual property producers who would benefit from increased intellectual 
property enforcement efforts. Therefore, the loss is greater than the gain, there being an 
understandable perception that a strong intellectual property regime in Indo nesia would 
only further the interests of those who own most of the world’s in tellectual property. 
And they are based in developed countries (Butt and Lindsey, 2005). 
Increased prices that will derive from more effective enforcement will make 
intellectual property-rich products unaffordable for all but a small portion of the 
population. These products range from pharmaceuticals to blockbuster movies and 
music. Third, the likely closure of pirate industries with increased enforcement would 
immediately, Butt and Lindsey (2005) claim, exacerbate already high unemployment 
rates. In this context, there is a widespread perception that improved protection would 
prevent unskilled workers from doing what is necessary to feed their families where 
there are very few alternative sources of income. In addition, there is a perceived in jus-
 tice in that there is no visible “victim” of infringement, the impact falling on fo reigners 
and remote corporations.
Organizations that deal with ip infringement policing in Indonesia, the best 
known of which is Yayasan Karya Cipta Indonesia (ycki), have little political clout 
and are no match for the strong, well-organized piracy syndicates and the resistance 
to effective enforcement by the legal system. Rather, the ycki’s local credibility has 
been significantly undermined because a large portion of the royalties it collects is 
distributed to non-nationals. Furthermore, because copyright law is foreign to most 
Indonesians, many of the people from whom ycki collects money believe the payments 
to be extortive. This combination of entitlement with the existence of Mafia-style 
institutions running the counterfeit business renders the ip environment a tough one 
to survive in. These kinds of mafias, it is worth noting, underpin the piracy industry 
across and beyond Asia.
Having alluded to the flavor of attitudes toward ip at the low end of the spec-
trum we now explore the high end, as in Japan.
Japan
Japan incurs ip losses of around US$34 billion per annum due to piracy and counter-
feiting (Fishman, 2005). Japan is undoubtedly at the most sophisticated end of the 
spectrum among Asian countries and economies. What is not commonly recognized 
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is that it owes this status to having acquired U.S. ip following the World War II. This is 
explained by Ajemian and Reid (2010), on whom this Japan section draws heavily. 
Given that Japan remains the world’s third largest economy, the role of ip in this 
scenario makes for a relatively long section.
Before World War II, Japan had observed the colonization of China by Western 
powers. It then built its own empire in Asia believing that this would prevent it from 
suffering the same fate as China. The vision and drive of Japan’s leadership enabled 
it to modernize at a lightening pace. Eventually, it clashed with the United States over 
control of the Pacific in the eastern theater of WWII. Along with those of its Euro-
pean allies, Germany and Italy, Japan’s economy was destroyed. It was occupied by 
the United States, which was faced with reconstructing every country that had par-
ticipated in the war. Technology would play a very large role in the success and speed 
of those efforts.
U.S. Containment Strategy
Emerging from WWII as a hegemonic force, the United States found itself facing a 
formidable adversary in the Soviet Union (Pyle, 2007: 210). U.S. policy leaders pursued 
a policy of containment. In its earliest form, containment held that the combined mi l-
itary forces of the United States and its allies, massive as they were, could not quickly 
or decisively defeat those of the Soviet Union and its more numerous Bloc countries. 
Therefore, U.S. policy would be to politically isolate the Soviet Union and contain 
any political or military expansion by the Soviet Union anywhere in the world until 
it collapsed from isolation. The goal, military advisor and diplomat George Kennan, 
known as the “father of containment,” averred, was “a policy of firm containment, 
designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where 
they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” 
(Isaacson and Thomas, 1986: 384). 
To carry out the strategy, the United States would need to create a strong alliance 
of anti-Soviet countries that would remain intact over time. The alliance would require 
both economic and military leadership, which the United States provided in what be-
came a highly organized system of international public goods (Makin, 1989: 16-17). 
The U.S. postwar international system consisted of aid to rebuild Europe (the Mar-
shall Plan) and, to a lesser degree, Japan (Makin, 1989: 18), a vibrant international system 
of free trade complete with various international development banks that would allow 
countries to rebuild and prosper (Bretton Woods), and military alliances to give con-
tainment credibility (Pyle, 2007: 215).
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Bretton Woods and Free Trade
A crucial assumption of postwar policy-makers was that the faltering of capitalism, 
which resulted from isolated and hostile trading blocs, had played a central role in 
causing WWII. To prevent this from happening again, in 1945, the United States cre-
ated the Bretton Woods system of stable international finance to promote free trade and 
avoid isolation (Pyle, 2007: 211-213). Ironically, the free-market system would also be 
used later in the Cold War against the Soviets to isolate it. By keeping its markets 
open to non-Soviet countries, which would hasten the rebuilding and development 
of their economies, free-market capitalism would quickly demonstrate its advantages 
and keep countries seeking its benefits within the fold of the West (Makin, 1989: 
18). Since most major economic centers lay outside of the Soviet Union, the isolation 
would affect only the Soviet Bloc while the West thrived. Eventually the Soviets would 
collapse. 
The Yoshida Doctrine
The Yoshida Doctrine, so named by Pyle (1992: 18) after the visionary Japanese prime 
minister, was Japan’s postwar policy of concentrating on economic growth while relying 
upon the United States for security. This policy arose from the conditions set by the 
United States after its defeat in WWII. Japan’s occupation by the United States was to 
last for seven years. U.S. policy goals were to exorcise Japan of fascism and to prevent 
any future threat of Japanese imperialism (Pyle, 2007: 215). Only two years into that 
occupation, however, the United States shifted gears to making Japan its primary Asian 
ally in the Cold War. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 stimulated this change. 
As Komiya and Itoh explained, 
After the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China, the threats of the Soviet 
Union and China in the Western Pacific evidently increased, and U.S. policy shifted swiftly 
from weakening the Japanese economy to promoting its reconstruction and development. 
A strong Japan would not only lessen the burden of economic aid for the United States but 
also make Japan a bridgehead of Western democracy in the Far East, an area where East-
West tension was high. From the United States’ point of view, it was necessary to provide 
Japan with ample opportunities to engage in worldwide trade. (1988:179)
The United States targeted Japan for special treatment. As one U.S. government 
official wrote in 1952,
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The most highly industrialized country in the Far East must remain outside the Soviet 
orbit if there is to be a free Asia, and to this end U.S. policy should be directed…even to the 
extent of providing an unrestricted market for such Japanese goods as American consumers 
find attractive. (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998: 177)
This meant that Japan would receive financial aid, access to U.S. markets, and 
political and military protection from the United States (Pyle, 2007: 212-213). As 
Chalmers Johnson put it, America did “everything an ally could to help” Japan regain 
its economic footing during the postwar period (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998). 
Perhaps most significantly, Japan was spared the psychological and material costs of 
participating in international politics. But also important was that the United States 
kept its markets open to Japan’s goods while allowing Japan to severely limit access to 
its own economy. As Pyle notes, “Pursuing policies of economic nationalism within 
a free-trade order would not ordinarily have been tolerated, but because the United 
States was locked in a life or death struggle with the communist bloc and gave priority 
to the health of its security alliance with Japan, the strategy succeeded” (2007: 212). 
Additionally, the expanding world trade that the United States was promoting 
through the International Monetary Fund (iMf) and the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (gatt) permitted a vigorous expansion of Japanese manufactured goods. 
By adopting new Western technology rapidly, it would strive to produce and export 
increasing quantities of more technologically advanced and internationally competi-
tive products. Accordingly, Japan gave priority to industries that made the most sense 
for export-led growth (Pyle, 2007: 249-257). “Under the Foreign Capital Law of 1950, 
proposals were judged for their usefulness in stimulating corporate growth and 
international competitiveness” (Shimada, 1991: 289-290). Because it was resource 
poor, Japan also limited imports as far as possible to primary products (raw materials, 
fuel, and food) and exported manufactured goods. In that way Japan became a val-
ue-adding trade nation (Pyle, 2007: 257).
Industrial Policy
During its high growth period of 1955-1971, Japan approached industrialization very 
differently from other countries. It created “industrial policy,” what Gilpin (1988: 
153) referred to as “the active participation of the state in shaping the industrial pattern 
of development.” Industrial policy was more than government-led national economic 
development, however. It was, according to Johnson (1982a: 236), a systematic array 
of supportive and coordinated programs, incentives and disincentives designed to 
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efficiently transfer international sources of technology at bargain rates to Japanese 
firms. Its application during Japan’s high-growth period positioned the country not 
only to completely rebuild its postwar economy, but to economically challenge its 
only benefactor, the United States. Technology transfer was, as Johnson (1982a: 16) 
argued of Japan’s industrial policy, “the heart of the matter.”
Because of containment policy goals of rebuilding former adversaries and U.S. 
attitudes toward free-market capitalism, Japan had easy access to new, proven, and 
inexpensive Western technology, which it imported in large quantities. Between 1951 
and 1984, more than 40 000 separate contracts were signed by Japanese firms to acquire 
foreign technology; over that 34-year period, Japan paid US$17 billion in royalties, a 
small fraction of annual U.S. r&D costs. Japan obtained nylon from DuPont, nuclear 
power from General Electric and Westinghouse, the transistor from Bell Laborato-
ries, and television tubes from Corning Inc. Licensed U.S. ip contributed the techno-
logical basis for nearly all of Japan’s modern industries (Pyle, 2007: 249). 
The transfer slowed, but continued long after Japan’s high growth period. In 
1981 alone, the Japanese Science and Technology Agency reported that 2 076 new 
technology introduction agreements were concluded with foreign suppliers at a cost of 
US$537 million. These figures were far greater than corresponding amounts for other 
countries (Doi, 1986: 159).
One particular Japanese government agency, the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (Miti), was responsible. It developed a highly effective method for collect-
ing international technology for redistribution to Japan’s larger firms. Miti’s research 
division monitored (mainly) U.S. companies for technology consistent with strategically 
targeted growth areas (steel, machinery, and petro-chemicals) in Japan’s economy. It 
then authorized foreign currency and granted a license for purchase by the Japanese firm, 
which was then also given a multitude of other benefits such as land, free or reduced-
cost installations, additional infrastructure, and tax breaks (Eads and Yamamura, 1987). 
Once transferred to the initial firm, the imported technology then circulated within 
networks begun in pre-war zaibatsu conglomerates (Imai, 1992: 213-214). 
As Johnson notes, 
before…the late 1960s and 1970s, no technology entered the country without Miti’s ap-
proval; no joint venture was ever agreed to without Miti’s scrutiny and frequent alteration 
of the terms; no patent rights were ever bought without Miti’s pressuring the seller to lower 
the royalties or to make other changes advantageous to Japanese industry as a whole; and 
no program for the importation of foreign technology was ever approved until Miti and its 
various advisory committees had agreed that the time was right and that the industry 
involved was scheduled for ‘nurturing.’ (1982a: 17).
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It is unlikely there was ever such an unusual or successful system of technology 
transfer as Miti’s, not least because of its tight governmental control and singular vi-
sion. And the results were startling. During the postwar period, 1946-1976, the Japa-
nese economy grew 55-fold (Johnson, 1982a: 16). Rapidly decreasing technology costs 
(most evident in steel, autos, synthetic fibers, petrochemicals, and to a lesser degree, 
electronics) and late entry to industrialization allowed Japanese firms to skip the time-
consuming process of developing technology were crucial (Murakami, 1987). The 
United States secured its ally in the Cold War by gifting intellectual property.
Japan Catches Up
As a result of its effective technology transfer methods and the other benefits of its 
relationship with the United States, Japan made rapid advances in steel, automobiles, 
and consumer electronics. The short period of time in which these advances came 
gave rise to structural dislocation to the United States and Europe, whose share of 
world markets shrank as Japan’s expanded over the course of the Cold War (Okimoto 
and Inoguchi, 1988: 2). Japanese exports increased nearly 25 times between 1955 and 
1970. Between 1955 and 1987 they increased 114 times (Pyle, 2007). In 1952, Japan’s 
economy was only five percent that of the United States. By 1986 it was over half its 
size (Okimoto and Inoguchi, 1988: 1-2). 
Japan’s government agency Miti drove this process.  However, its success caused 
many problems for Japan, including “serious damage to relations with Japan’s main eco-
nomic partner, the United States, because of trade imbalances, an undervalued yen, and 
Japanese procrastination in implementing capital liberalization. Pressures for Japan to 
lower its trade barriers began in the mid-1960s. The first efforts were cosmetic and real 
liberalization came only slowly (Johnson, 1982b: 275-276).  Japanese resisted removing 
protectionist barriers to their high technology sectors either because they saw them as 
their most competitive or because doing so threatened Japanese values (Gilpin, 1988).
Recent Status
In February 2002, then Prime Minister Koizumi made a speech advocating a stronger 
Japanese patent system and encouraging more effective assertion of patent rights by Ja p-
anese companies. Since then, the Japanese government has created a Strategic Council 
on ip, created a new Intellectual Property High Court, amended Japanese import laws 
to prohibit importation of goods that infringe Japanese patents, and taken measures 
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to improve patent examination. In addition, he put into force a basic law on ip; adopted 
a strategic program for the creation, protection, and exploitation of ip; and did everything 
in his power to promote change in the Japanese corporate view of ip. Koizumi did his 
part. Have Japanese companies followed his lead and become more effective in assert-
ing their patent rights? Many commentators in the U.S. have looked at these government 
changes, and concluded that the attitude to ip has changed permanently in Japan.
The number of patent applications that a company makes indicates the size of the 
budget and the relative importance that company places on ip, although it might reveal 
very little about the company’s overall ip strategy (Ludlow, 2008). Japanese assignees 
are the largest single geographic origin for patents filed worldwide (Ludlow, 2008). The 
Derwent World Patents Index reveals that in electronics and semiconductors, Japanese 
received about 52 percent of all patents granted worldwide in 2005.
Japanese companies also dominate the list of top patent grant owners in the United 
States. More than half of the top ten annual assignees in the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (uspto) have been Japanese companies consistently over the past fifteen years. 
Ja pa nese companies have steadily increased their investments in patents. Over the 
15-year study period, the study group of the top five Japanese semiconductor compa-
nies has increased its collective total patent filings by a multiple of three (Ludlow, 2008). 
Ludlow explains that, in contrast, the study group of the top five U.S. semiconductor 
companies has increased its patent filings almost nine times. Despite this faster rate 
of increase, U.S. companies still lag behind, since the Japanese industry started from a 
much higher base number of patent grants in 1991. 
Having considered both ends of the spectrum across Asia with respect to ip, we 
will now look at the source of the greatest ip threat, China, beginning with its Special 
Administrative Region of Hong Kong. 
Hong Kong
We will reference Hong Kong (HK), now known as the Special Administrative Re-
gion of Hong Kong, having reverted to the motherland in 1997 after over a century 
of colonization by Great Britain. The Basic Law of Hong Kong separates the ip systems of 
China and HK. So there is an absence of mutual ip protection between the two regions. 
iprs registered in HK will not necessarily receive protection on the mainland. Means 
exist for mutual recognition of patent, trademark, and design applications between 
the two jurisdictions (Selby, 2003).
 Hong Kong is perhaps the most shining example of capitalism in the world backed 
by the rule of law. Such is the esteem for the HK legal system that many con tracts 
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signed in Asia, even on the China mainland, are signed with arbitration clauses where-
by if there is cause they will seek resolution in Hong Kong. 
 As a result, it boasts many law firms and other specialist service firms whose 
areas of expertise include:
•  Advising clients on patent, trademark, copyright, and design infringements 
in Hong Kong and China and instituting legal proceedings and arranging 
administrative proceedings to protect these rights;
•  advising clients on domain name disputes and copyright issues relating to the 
use of the Internet;
•  assisting clients on obtaining trademark, patent, and design protection in 
Hong Kong, China, and the Asia Pacific region;
•  assisting clients in the licensing and assignment of patents, trademarks, com-
puter software, domain names, and other ip rights;
•  conducting due diligence in transactional matters, advising on assignments, 
franchising, and the licensing of ip Rights in Hong Kong and China; and
•  coordinating and managing clients’ portfolios of ip rights (Managing Intellectual 
Property, 2005).
 Collectively all the major tools and institutional arrangements exist in HK to 
muster high levels of protection across China and other Asian markets. So we begin 
to explore why there remains a widespread ipr enforcement problem.
China
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) is now the world’s second largest economy 
and perhaps the most atavistic of all ip environments (Reid and MacKinnon, 2010).
IPR-Loss Risks in China
China claims, rightfully, to have made tremendous progress in developing an ip protec-
tion framework, and complaining too much threatens to sour the trading relationship 
at the highest level (Wall Street Journal, 2007). Much political rhetoric emanating from 
the United States, unfortunately, ignores this and threatens damaging what could be 
a much more productive relationship (Romney, 2012). 
 For a considerable time, Western and Japanese companies have viewed Chinese 
companies as global ip pariahs, anticipating they will steal their proprietary for mulations 
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and software (Buckley, 2005; De Filippo and Ip, 2006). iprs are clearly difficult to pro-
tect because of their inherent “shareability” in that they may be in use simultaneously 
by an infinite number of people. 
 In view of China’s recent reforms on ip protection (see next section), Lieberthal 
(2005) maintains that Western firms will have to rethink the manner in which they 
develop new technologies and bring them to market. In the quest for growth, Lieber-
thal contends, local officials are encouraged, via close ties to state-owned and other 
enterprises, to engage in corruptive practice. This ensures that wealth is generated at 
local levels by virtue of officials’ connections to these local firms. If local companies 
generate profits, and government officials derive incomes from these firms that are in 
turn linked to the theft of ip, it follows that these companies can then obtain protection 
from the same local government officials even if the courts rule against them. In China, 
the courts and their officers are often subservient to these local government officials, 
so the only way the central government can intercept and influence the process is to 
break the links that tie local officials to firms.
 Breaking these links, in reality, is very difficult to accomplish due to the impact 
this would have on the incomes of local officials and their families as well as others 
in their matrix of networks. As we can see in Figure 1, the mayor of a Chinese city 
has overriding responsibility that transcends conflicting interests. Any changes that 
impact on the security of employment also imperil social stability, a topic that reso-
nates both with local government as well as Beijing. So if a complaint comes into the 
mayor’s office about pollution or ipr infringement, the mayor will always have to remain 
sensitive to the impact on employment and taxation revenues before heavy-handedly 
agreeing to a draconian measure like shutting down a plant. 
Figure 1 
CONFLICTING GOVERNANCE ISSUES 
Note: sepa stands for State Environmental Protection Agency.
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AmCham-China’s 2011 Business Climate Survey demonstrates that an increas-
ing proportion of member companies regard China’s ipr enforcement as a top busi-
ness concern. The 2011 survey reveals a rise in the percentage of members who rank 
ipr infringement among the top five business challenges, from 19 percent in 2010 to 
24 percent in 2011. Some of the negative perceptions have changed little in the last five 
years, as can be shown by studying the AmCham-China (2006) report. It showed that 
55 percent were hurt by violations of ip rights and 41 percent of U.S. companies in China 
believe counterfeiting of their products increased in 2005. ip infringements were cited 
less frequently (21 percent) as being one of the top business challenges in 2007 (Am-
cham-China, 2008b). 
However, a national ipr enforcement campaign began at the end of October 2010. 
In March 2011, the campaign was extended an additional three months. This new 
campaign places the Ministry of Commerce (Mofcom) back in the lead, coordinating 
enforcement initiatives and software legalization among the relevant agencies. Am-
Cham-China members have actively engaged with the Chinese government on the 
campaign and have been pleased by many of the concrete outcomes that have resulted 
from the government’s initiative.
It is clear, however, that many areas still require immediate attention. These con-
cerns include substantial structural problems, such as weak punishment deterrence for 
ipr infringements, failure to criminalize illegal software usage by enterprises, local 
protectionism in the form of stronger ipr enforcement for local brands, disproportio n-
ately low resource allocation to copyright agencies and ip crime enforcement, and 
varying local administrative enforcement practices (AmCham-China, 2011).
The hardest-hit companies were, as in Indonesia, those involved in movies; fash-
ion knockoffs such as Gucci purses; software; networking technologies (e.g., Cisco 
clones); automotive parts; and pharmaceuticals. AmCham-China 2006 reports may, 
in some way, be tendentious insofar as members may vent to spur action from Bei-
jing. However, the findings lend support to Lieberthal’s argument that Beijing, while 
trying to implement its recently introduced ip protection laws, is being undermined 
by local governments.
IPR Protection Regulation Activity in China
The introduction of tough new ip regulations in China, together with increasing en-
forcement is, however, beginning to change the perception of China as an ip sinkhole, 
and a plethora of companies are taking high technology to China (Scott, 2006). None-
theless, the changing climate for this contentious issue has importance beyond the 
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normally associated province of hard-wired high-tech product arenas; it applies to 
industries such as pharmaceuticals, software, trademark, and other rights-based busi-
nesses. For example, in 2004, the Chinese patent review board invalidated Pfizer’s 
patent on Viagra, unleashing sharp criticism about the country’s record on ip protection. 
Signaling a marked change of approach, China’s president, Hu Jintao, on his 2006 
visit to the U.S., stated that the protection of iprs was “essential” for China’s develop-
ment and its ability to build an economy based on innovation rather than low-cost 
manufacturing (McGregor, 2006). Significantly, in June 2006, a Beijing court backed 
patent protection for Viagra by overturning the earlier ruling by the patent review board 
(Zamiska, 2006). This was seen as a potential landmark case for foreign companies 
seeking greater protection of ip against the flood of fakes and counterfeits.
 An additional problem met by Pfizer, like many other foreign players, was that 
it failed to appreciate the need for and significance of Chinese brand names and to 
what extent they constitute a critical part of a branding and trademark strategy. Failing 
to provide a Chinese brand name in a timely fashion is to invite the Chinese popula-
tion to invent one. This they did, even before the product had reached the market. The 
name, Weige, became the everyday reference term for the product but remained be-
yond the control of Pfizer. Chinese branding is one of several elements on the foreign 
investors’ report card that calls for improvement.
Breach Behavior in China
There are many examples of China-based ipr breaches. Huawei Technologies, for exam-
ple, China’s leading telecom-equipment maker, was successfully sued by Cisco for ip 
theft in a U.S. court. Huawei is one of the so-called “state champions” that the central 
government decided would be among the thirty to fifty of its best state firms to be 
built into “globally competitive” multinationals by 2010 (The Economist, 2005a). At 
home, these companies enjoy tax breaks, cheap land, and virtually free funding via 
the state-owned banks. Abroad, the Chinese government helps them secure contracts 
or explo ration rights (The Economist, 2005b). In the conflict with Cisco, pundits agree, 
Huawei decided that its development in Europe and the U.S. would be less hindered 
if it cleared the accusations of technology theft. 
 Chinese car firms counterfeit foreign models pervasively: one local favorite is 
half Mercedes, half bMw. So ahead of the game are the counterfeiters, that Harry Potter 
books were published in China before J. K. Rowling, the author, had written them. 
AmCham-China’s president maintains, “the problem [of ip theft] is growing faster 
than the enforcement efforts...and this problem of growing exports is really one to 
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watch because that is going to reverberate against China on the international stage” 
(AmCham-China, 2006). Perhaps some allowance for cultural impediments on the 
Chinese side is called for to establish a tighter ip protection regime (Yang, 2005). For 
example at stages during the Qing dynasty (1644 to 1912), China ruled almost a third 
of the world’s population and oversaw a third of world gross domestic product (gDp). 
It looks back on a history of innovation, spanning the inventions of paper money, ex-
plosives, the printed book, and the professional civil service (Maddison, 2001). Today, 
more than a vestige of resentment remains among the Chinese population that their 
inventions attracted none of the royalties they are now exhorted to pay others. 
IP Misunderstandings and Complications
ip conflicts are perhaps the result of straightforward misunderstandings due to lan-
guage difficulties and culture-based nuances. Chinese and U.S. managers seemingly 
communicate less because of the language barrier, thereby creating misunderstand-
ing about ip issues (Yang, 2005). Of course, things are much more complicated than 
this; for example, a magazine formerly billed as China’s Rolling Stone is now limited to 
using its name of Audiovisual World since local regulators banned it from using the U.S. 
title’s masthead. The cover designers, however, have endeavored to make the Chinese 
characters for Audiovisual World resemble the word “Rolling.” Such visual contor-
tions underscore the legal and regulatory complexities surrounding foreign involve-
ment with trademark issues (Dickie, 2006). 
 An increasing number of software companies as well as cios from a variety of 
industries are looking to China to outsource some of their software development. 
Companies can perhaps learn from the outsourcing experience of the software in-
dustry. Some of the more successful beneficiaries of this phenomenon, such as wipro 
Technologies and Infosys (both interviewed in 2006), have established proper safe-
guards that leave their employees no way of copying code or sending it outside the 
workplace. Key measures they have implemented include using computers without 
usb or disk drives and strict control of external network connections. Projects are divided 
into different pieces and across separate sites, so that no single employee has the com-
plete picture. Visitors to their facilities are obliged to reveal each item of electronic 
equipment and are subject to careful scrutiny. This contrasts with Microsoft, also inter-
viewed in 2006: employees at its Redmond campus are allowed to bring in a variety 
of computers with no restriction on the use of usb drives. 
 To protect ip assets, an ip management strategy should be developed and imple-
mented prior to conducting business in high-risk parts of the world (Brown et al., 
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2005). As others have elaborated, many executives still think of protecting ip solely in 
legal terms —sometimes only after property has been stolen (Dietz, Lin, and Yang, 2005). 
 The way to be sure of reaping all the business benefits of an outsourcing transac-
tion according to Whalen and Hsieh (2006) is through vigorous protection of intellectual 
property assets. To address the risks of having its trade secrets misappropriated when 
a company outsources its work to China, the company should consider: 1) re gistering 
ip with the relevant governmental agencies of China; 2) having native speakers on site 
at the service provider’s premises to educate its employees on preservation of confi-
dential information; 3) making sure that the Chinese service provider has assets in the 
U.S. and is jointly liable for any acts of misappropriation by their employees; 4) en-
suring all services have sufficient errors and omissions coverage; 5) ensuring the 
indemnification clause addresses liability of the U.S. company for its Chinese service 
provider’s errors and omissions; and 6) videotaping the reading and signing of the agree-
ments. In drafting the outsourcing contract, attorneys should specify what infor mation 
is considered a trade secret; impose a duty upon the provider to immediately seek in-
junctive relief for any misappropriation, and require security experts to be employed by 
the provider. The measures to protect ip in an outsourcing transaction have to begin 
with the companies’ own internal procedures.
 This author’s finding, based on field research as well as ongoing connections 
with trade associations, chambers of commerce and business-based pressure groups in 
China, reveals that, while there is a great deal of discontent among foreign players 
concerning Beijing’s ability to offer protection to ip owners, many of those ip owners’ 
procedures for protecting their ip are ineffectual (Reid and MacKinnon, 2010). 
 The central message of my research, conducted in China during 2006 with ip 
owners, ip law firms, and consultants, is that the environment for ip protection, and 
potential for obtaining redress, is somewhat improved. This is supported by inter-
views I conducted in China during 2011. Companies were reporting more support 
both in attitudinal and resource terms from the Public Security Bureau (China’s po-
lice, or psb)  and other authorities.
 The management of ip cannot be left to technology managers or corporate legal 
staff alone. It must be a matter of concern for functional and business-unit leaders as 
well as a corporation’s most senior officer (Reitzig, 2004). An organization needs to be 
able to describe the technology and the ip rights that give it exclusivity in that technology, 
as well as any potential liabilities (Feng and Golden, 2002). Reid and MacKinnon (2010) 
suggest that to be able to assess and inventory company ip, you must know where to 
look. A company needs to determine whether it does, in fact, have rights to its ip. If it 
does, there are some methodical steps it can take to ensure they do not dissipate, for 
which they propose the application of their BARD framework.
49
Intellectual ProPerty rIghts
essays
the europeAn unIon
The European Union (EU) 27 covers 4 324 782 sq. km., slightly less than half of the area 
of the U.S., yet with its population of almost five hundred million dispersed across 
highly de veloped economies, it achieves the status of the world’s single largest mar-
ketplace. ip is dear to the main body of European countries. Indeed the EU Chamber of 
Commerce runs seminars in China for its members and others with the express objec-
tive of alerting them to the pitfalls of doing business in China from an ip perspective.
 It is estimated that the EU incurs ip losses of around US$40 billion per annum due 
to counterfeiting (Fishman, 2005). Indeed, trafficking in fake goods is as lucrative as 
dealing in narcotics and weapons for organized criminals —and it has a lower risk for 
prosecution, says Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission (ec) 
(Ebert, 2008). McDermott (2007) offers information regarding the international Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (acta), which aims at combating the production 
and trade of fakes. It states that the member nations, including the U.S., Canada, the 
EU, Japan, and Korea have pledged to protect intellectual property rights by enforcing 
stronger laws, closer cross-border cooperation in law enforcement, and adopting prac-
tices that make enforcement real and effective.
 The EU 27 clamped down in a singular effort (Ebert, 2008). Reiterating the roles 
played by Mafiosi-like organizations that are engaged in ip theft, EC President Barroso 
Figure 2
THE STATE OF CHINA’S IPR ENFORCEMENT
How would you rate China’s enforcement of iprs?
Source: AmCham Business Climate Surveys, 2003, 2005, 2008. 
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argued, “Counterfeiting now takes place on an industrial scale. The days when fake 
goods meant shifty men with a suitcase full of Rolexes, or teenagers swapping cheap 
computer games, are over” (Ebert, 2008). The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (oecD) estimates that global trade in fake products is worth about 
US$200 billion, “higher than the gross domestic product of more than 150 countries” 
(Ebert, 2008). 
 As Klamecki (2008) explains, “The physical expansion of the European Union 
has implied a parallel evolution in its political and economic sectors. The European 
Union is marked by the principle of subsidiary, which allows the member states to 
legislate in fields where the Community does not have any competency area and in-
tervene when a supranational norm becomes necessary to harmonize the government 
of the Single Market. Depending on the subject, the field of action is more or less left to 
the Member States.”
 This organization of the EU is cumbersome and complex. When 27 countries 
agree to share policies, it can become even more complex for a foreign, non-commu-
nity settled company. And the situation with respect to iprs is no exception. Though the 
EU has developed rules and regulations relating to European patents, or the commu-
nity trademark, ip rights remain national rights (Klamecki, 2008). This can be destabilizing 
for a company that wishes to establish itself in Europe and license trademarked goods. 
Indeed, the free movement of goods and services governs subsequent principles, such as 
the community-wide exhaustion of rights, and is the basis of European competition 
law that regulates licensing agreements.   
 The EU also finds China a challenging ip environment. Since 2006, improve-
ments have been made on the policing and prosecution side of things. Furthermore, 
my interviews revealed the vast majority of these cases involve local companies in 
dispute with other local companies about rights infringements. Of 77 463 ipr cases 
brought to the courts in 2007, 74 200 have been decided (AmCham-China, 2008a). 
 However, as was explained in an email to this author by the ip officer of the EU 
delegation to Beijing, first cases have to be accepted as ip cases by the legal machine. 
Apparently the “li an” system, the case acceptance system, impacts not so much on 
the total number of ip cases heard in court annually, but rather on the official number 
of interim injunctions granted. Chinese officials stress that the success rate for ap-
plications for interim injunctions is higher than 80 percent. In reality, however, only 
2 percent of the applications are indeed successful. This difference is caused by the li 
an system. The 80-percent-plus number does not show how many applications were 
not even admitted for a decision by the court. An applicant files a motion for injunction 
with the court. Before the court accepts and establishes a case, it will look at whether 
all requirements are fulfilled. Often, the application is already rejected at this stage 
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(e.g., because of the lack of an acceptable guarantee by a Chinese bank). An application 
suffering this fate is not counted in the statistics. Only an established case will then 
be formally decided. That means, in turn, that the courts will accept only those ap pli-
cations deemed highly likely to be granted. This leads to an artificially high success 
rate in the official statistics. 
 The li an problem is even bigger in the administrative enforcement system of 
China, where it can be used by administrative authorities to frustrate applicants by 
not granting their case establishment. Without a formally established case, no action 
can be taken. There is no remedy in practice to address the refusal of administrative 
enforcement authorities to accept a case (Pattloch, 2009). 
 Since 2004, the EU has a new set of rules governing the licensing of patents. As 
defined by Article l (l) (h) of Commission Regulation (ec) 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 
on the application of Article 81 (3) of the EU Treaty to categories of technology transfer 
agreements (ttber), the term “patents” encompasses patent applications, utility models, 
applications for registration of utility models, designs, topographies of semiconduc-
tor products, supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products or other 
products for which such supplementary protection certificates may be obtained, and 
plant breeder’s certificates. There is no shortage of pitfalls marking the new regime, 
and the learning curve is steep. Moreover, the stakes are high: since it is no longer 
possible to notify the European Commission (the Commission or ec) of an agreement 
about a negative clearance or individual exemption, companies must rely chiefly on self-
assessment, described by Marquis (2007) as the key buzzword in the “modernized” 
world of ec competition law.
 One company to feel the brunt of the tough approach to EU monitoring and 
regulatory control was Microsoft. Claiming that it was attempting to protect its ip, 
the company maintained a longstanding action to resist releasing the source code of 
its operating system software to third-party developers. Just a week before the 2004 
decision, The Economist (2007) revealed that the company had offered a friendly set-
tlement of the case, but this was brushed aside by then-EU Competition Commissioner 
Mario Monti, who opted instead for a formal decision that “would set clear principles 
concerning the future conduct of Microsoft, to avoid going back to these sorts of abuses” 
(The Economist, 2007) Microsoft promptly lodged an appeal with the EU’s Court of 
First Instance (cfi), which upheld the European Commission’s 2004 decision. Micro-
soft subsequently gave up. 
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north AmerIcA
Given that the largest concentration of iprs resides in the United States, this section 
will be viewed primarily through a U.S. lens with less focus on Canada and Mexico. 
After examining the EU above, it is clear that the United States and the European 
Union differ significantly in terms of their innovative capacity: the former has been able 
to gain and maintain world leadership in innovation and technology while the latter 
continues to lag behind (Crescenzi, Rodriguez-Pose, and Storper, 2007). 
Notwithstanding the magnitude of this innovation gap and the political emphasis 
placed upon it on both sides of the Atlantic, the empirical literature has emphasized the 
structural differences between the two continents in the quantity and quality of the major 
“inputs” to innovation: r&D investments and human capital (Crescenzi, Rodriguez-
Pose, and Storper, 2007). Largely we are talking of ip. The higher mobility of capital, 
population, and knowledge in the U.S., Crescenzi, Rodriguez-Pose, and Storper (2007) 
explain, not only promotes the agglomeration of research activity in specific areas of the 
country but also enables a variety of territorial mechanisms to fully exploit local in-
novative activities and (informational) synergies. But in the European Union, imper-
fect market integration and institutional and cultural barriers across the continent 
inhibit the development of ip, so these activities remain at lower than U.S. rates.
ip protection topics were some of the key negotiation issues in the nafta agree-
ment and that component of it was hailed as significant by Roberto Villarreal Gonda, 
general director of technological development at Mexico’s Ministry of Trade (Buch-
holz, 1992). So, when studying China’s rapid development and its impact on nafta, 
Reid, Jimenez, and Rahner (2006) commented on the lack of a rich, nafta- based ip 
literature. These authors demonstrated the success of China’s exports to the U.S. to 
the detriment of Mexico, despite nafta. Searches of the major business databases (ABI 
Inform, Academic Search Elite, Business Source Complete, and Business Source Elite) 
revealed comparatively little in the way of refereed journal hits, and a relative pau-
city of articles beyond the year 2000. An exception to this was an article by Penfold, 
Batteson, and Dickerson (2005), who concentrated on a specific category of iprs, im-
age rights, and compared the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and Europe. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, copyrights lasted for fourteen years and 
could be extended another fourteen if the copyright holder petitioned for an exten-
sion. Today, corporate copyrights last for ninety five years, while individuals retain 
copyrights for seventy years after their deaths. Occasionally extensions are granted. 
The most recent extension of copyright, passed by the Congress in 1998, was nick-
named the Mickey Mouse Protection Act, because Disney’s lobbyists were intent on 
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keeping Mickey Mouse from falling into the public domain —and on preserving bil-
lions in profits for Disney (No cera, 2005).
The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that American companies lose be-
tween US$20 billion and US$24 billion annually from counterfeiting and piracy 
(Fishman, 2005; wipo, 2007). ip accounts for 75 percent of Fortune one hundred com-
panies’ total assets (Kunzler and Payne, 2004; Reitzig, 2004). For U.S. manufacturing 
firms the share comprising ip is 70 percent (Rivette and Kline, 2000). Nearly 75 per-
cent of the Dow 30’s value is now in intangible, people-based “assets” including knowl-
edge, business processes, and ip that is not yet adequately reflected in financial state-
ments (Kunzler and Payne, 2004). Moreover, 35 percent of patented technologies, valued 
at US$1 trillion, is treated as wasting assets (Rivette and Kline, 2000); the scale is huge. 
More could be done to ensure the integrity of ip. Unfortunately, U.S. companies have 
been shown to be careless in ensuring their intellectual property does not leak (Reid 
and MacKinnon, 2010). 
There is no evidence to suggest that the Canadians are any better positioned on 
this score. Nortel Networks Ltd., a Canadian one-time giant telecommunications firm 
that has now fallen on hard times, demonstrates the slackness prevalent with respect 
to ip protection. Gorman (2012) revealed how seven passwords were stolen from top 
Nortel executives, including the chief executive. Hackers —who appeared to be work-
ing in China— penetrated Nortel’s computers as far back as 2000, perhaps earlier, 
and over the years downloaded technical papers, research-and-development reports, 
business plans, employee emails, and other documents.
The hackers also hid spying software so deeply within some employees’ comput-
ers that it took investigators years to realize the pervasiveness of the problem. They had 
considerable time to do their damage. All they had to do was figure out what they 
wanted and it was there for the taking. The only steps the company took were to recast 
the seven passwords. This shoddy management behavior perhaps explains why the 
company ended up selling its intellectual properties and assets after filing for bank-
ruptcy in Canada (Beer, 2011). Kennedy-Pannett (2009), discussing ip protection poli-
cies among corporations in Canada, maintains that ip protection is a way to guarantee 
profits for corporations as it protects product inventions. Yet, Canada, one of the sig-
natories to the trips agreement, has suffered from unrestrained piracy that has re portedly 
caused over a million job losses in 2007. In May 2009, Canada was put on the U.S. 
Trade Representatives’ priority watch list (Thompson, 2010).
Mexico is not generally thought of as a rich repository of ip. However, this is not 
so. It is a country with a rich cultural heritage, which arguably provides opportunities 
for harvesting ip benefits. Tequila, a traditional beverage emblematic of Mexico, is part 
of that national cultural identity (Olmedo-Carranza, 2009). Archeological and anthropo-
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logical sites and pieces, as exemplified by Teotihuacan, are ripe for sensitive exploi-
tation (Webmoor, 2008). However, criminal networks based in the United States and 
Mexico have benefited enormously from globalization. They have been able to reap 
for tunes by illegally trafficking commodities, some of which are based on pirated and 
counterfeit ip (Naim, 2003). 
There can be downsides to ip protection. In their study to determine whether 
implementation of the trips Agreement in Latin American and Caribbean countries 
has generated patent legislation sensitive to public health needs, Oliveira et al. (2004) 
found that Mexico was one of the Latin American countries that did not allow for paral-
lel importing of pharmaceuticals. Believing there to be little empirical evidence 
concerning the effects of intellectual property rights in technologically advanced 
developing countries, Léger (2005) examined the Mexican maize-breeding industry. 
She showed that, contrary to the hypothesis that iprs would support innovation, they 
play no role in the industry. 
Léger argues that ipr theory should be revised to include characteristics of de-
veloping countries critical for the good functioning of ipr. In this respect, she listed the 
quality of the institutional environment and the importance of transaction. Given Mex-
ico’s relatively good score in these critical dimensions, iprs, she concluded, are likely 
to play an even smaller role in other developing countries. Finally, a very important 
perspective is that the ip regime privileges the interests of North America to the detri-
ment of Latin America. The price exacted for economic integration with the neighbors 
to the north is more painful for Mexican maize farmers, among many, than for U.S. 
engineering companies or brand owners venturing south. 
Having performed a superficial survey of the literature relating to Asia, the EU, 
and North America as it applies to ip, I shall try to suss out some key propositions.
dIstIllAtIon
As Goldsmith, Ramos, and Steiger (2006) put it, the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights (ipr) has been a contentious issue for more than twenty years. Industrialized 
nations have moved to knowledge-based economies, and simultaneously, trade bar-
riers have fallen, making ip vulnerable. Adding to this vulnerability are conflicting 
international institutional environments, belief systems, and economic realities. The 
debate over ipr protection has become an acute global trade issue that pits the net-
technology-producing economies (ntpes) against those that are net-technology-con-
suming (ntces). As a result, there has been much debate about the impact of alternative 
ipr regimes (tight or loose) on the welfare of ntces. Policy makers, often to protect 
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their trade interconnectedness in both sets of economies, search for arguments to 
persuade resistant ntces to follow the ntpes’ model of strict ipr regimes. The ntces, 
faced with a dilemma, search for arguments to justify looser regimes or to convince 
their populations that tighter regimes are in the best interests of the nation.
 Arguably there are five key dimensions to this issue:
• level of ip ownership and generation;
• trade interconnectedness;
• machinery to police and protect ip;
• motivation to comply; and
• subversion in the governance system.
level of Ip ownershIp And generAtIon
Clearly, ntpes have the incentives to ensure that their ip is exploited in fair environ-
ments where they may have recourse to the law should infringements occur. When they 
consider the behavior of less ip-oriented markets they tend to privilege their posi-
tions as ip owners.
trAde Interconnectedness
Where there is trade between ntpes and ntces, the necessary preconditions exist to 
work toward putting in place ip protection regimes. To keep trade relations on a steady 
track, ntces feel obliged to see that they take ipr issues seriously and may introduce 
the necessary regulatory framework to prosecute violators. That does not necessarily 
mean these provisions are applied as they should be. 
mAchInery to polIce And protect Ip
For many countries, especially net-technology-consuming economies, the machinery 
does not yet exist to police and protect ip, or it is lagging behind the requirements of the 
ip environment, even in countries like China, which now has an ip regulatory frame-
work. The Public Security Bureau (psb) requires the evidence of private investigatory 
firms to provide the basis for an investigation. So when the ipr sleuthing agency amasses 
the evidence to show that a party is in violation, then they will act. 
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motIvAtIon to comply
For a variety of reasons, such as protection of local interests, the government and po-
licing agencies may be motivated to varying degrees to protect or ignore ip infringe-
ments. And this practice is pervasive. 
subversIon In the governAnce system
In some cases, the governance structures in situ work against establishing a stricter ip 
environment. As we saw illustrated in Figure 1, the nature of the governance system 
may work against protecting iprs.
 Figure 3 attempts to offer an intuitive illustration on how the countries at each end 
of the ipr continuum (Indonesia and the United States) compare, based on the five 
dimensions outlined above. Arguably, regarding trade interconnectivity, the U.S. eco n-
omy is more interconnected than Indonesia. The U.S. is much better endowed with 
ip ownership. Lawsuits brought to address ipr infringements are much less likely to 
be subverted by the courts and those connected to court officials. Because Indonesia 
Figure 3 
THE FIVE DIMENSIONS
Note: The numbers on the horizontal axis are dimensionless quantities for comparative illustration purposes only.
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Figure 4 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS EXPOSURE 
Indonesia (outer ring) versus the United States (inner ring)
is part of the world trading economy and has been a member of the World Trade Orga-
ni zation (wto) since January 1995, there is motivation to comply. Moreover this mo-
tivation at the national governmental level has meant that utilitarian legal machinery 
has been installed. 
 In Figure 4, the dimensions from Figure 3 have been drawn with the U.S. in the 
inner ring and Indonesia on the perimeter. Figure 4 is intended as a metaphor to illus-
trate that the combinations of these dimensions in the United States result in a tighter 
protection level for iprs, whereas in Indonesia the picture is more porous. In other 
words, ip protection is much harder to guarantee in Indonesia, and this pattern applies 
to greater and lesser degrees, depending upon the stage of economic development 
and the degree to which economies are net technology producers (ntpes) or ntces. 
Figure 5 illustrates this principle by way of an S-Curve. It shows that as the process of 
economic development progresses, the ownership of iprs increases. On the left we can 
see how ntces are clustered under the first part of the curve, and with development, 
they ultimately transition from ntce status to that of ntpes, which means they have 
something to lose by not being fastidious about protection. Arguably China is ap-
proaching the cusp, the threshold at which these issues need to be addressed. 
Machinery
Motivation
Subversion
IP Ownership
Trade Interconnectivity
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concludIng observAtIons
The importance of iprs as key components of the economic system is clear. Those 
who own them need to protect them, and in the realm of international business, they 
must be able to rely on the legal machinery in the foreign markets they enter. The EU, 
Japan, and the United States are now the countries with the largest concentrations of 
iprs and thus are the players with the most to lose from regimes that do not respect ipr 
protection. We have seen how the acquisition of iprs was a major plank in the struc-
ture of Japan’s post-WWII economic development, and this is increasingly becom-
ing so with China. Though in China’s case, many argue that much of the ip it has so 
far acquired is misappropriated. However, as China becomes increasingly vested 
with its own ip, it is tending more toward the behavior of a net-technology-producing 
economy, but this will continue to be compounded at the provincial and local levels 
for some time to come since misappropriation of Chinese iprs can apply within China 
as well as with foreign-owned rights. 
 So, a quandary exists. In ntces, there is less motivation to comply by using the 
protection apparatus that may exist. This raises the question of how these ntces can 
be brought into a better state of compliance. There is no simple answer to this question. 
Further study and research is necessary to explore methods and approaches whereby 
Figure 5 
IP OWNERSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Note: ntces refers to net technology-consuming economies; ntpes refers to net technology-producing economies.
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improved levels of compliance can be achieved. The answer may be one that is are-
na-specific. “Cleantech,” for instance, is the name given to those emerging industries 
that focus on cleaning air and water as well as industrial processes. As an example 
of an arena-specific study, in a related paper (Ajemian and Reid, 2010), the potential is 
explored for a meta-initiative based on pooling of U.S., EU, and Japanese iprs to fa-
cilitate the flow of so-called cleantech iprs to China to assist in the clean-up of China as 
a result of its rapid development. Much more work needs to be done in this field. 
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